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Cain's Law
Elizabeth Mensch*
In the heady days of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) conferences, we rarely
discussed Bible stories. I am going to start, however, with Cain and Abel, or
at least with an amateur Augustinian take on Cain and Abel. As Oliver
O'Donovan has pointed out, the story provides a useful metaphorical frame
for considering the task of human judging.' My goal in starting with this
story, and then moving on to some Christian theology, is to suggest that the
classical period of the High Middle Ages, which is Steven Smith's primary
historical reference point, has never been the only Christian view of how
divine justice relates to human judging. While many did strive to find
continuity between human law and the law of God during that classical
period, a long and vibrant Christian tradition instead stresses rupture and
discontinuity. That tradition's more deconstructive zeal, now revived by
post-modernist forays into Christian theology, is not unlike the old CLS
spirit, despite the Christian vocabulary. Many in CLS would have found
that downright peculiar.
Cain, seizing for himself an absolute power over the life of his brother,
slaughtered Abel in a fit of self-centered rage, and Abel's blood cried out
from the ground.' It still cries out, one might say, as the cry of all the
numberless victims of human violence and domination.
So what happens? Cain, guilty of wanton slaughter, is exiled from the
presence of God, but he is also given divine protection; 3 indeed, he becomes
the metaphoric founder of human civilization,4 including the civilizing task
of judging. Following Cain, people begin to seize authority over other
people, no longer, Augustine says, man over beast, as God intended, but now
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1. See OLIVER O'DONOVAN, THE WAYS OF JUDGMENT 27 (2005) (discussing the story of Cain
and Abel as it relates to judgment).
2. Genesis 4:8-10.
3. Genesis 4:10-16.
4. Genesis 4:17-22.

man over man. 5 Cain now sarcastically claims that authority over Abel.
Those of us who deal in law are thus all the children of Cain, in penal exile
from God and inevitably tainted by law's violence. Steven Smith quotes
Robert Cover for a similar point: inevitably, "[law] takes place in a field of
pain and death.", 6 Nor, of course, could the law that was metaphorically
instituted by Cain really provide justice for that primal, infinite crime that
lies at the heart of its own founding. What could be a "just" legal response
to centuries of bloodshed?
In Augustinian Christian terms, the answer could lie only in a messianic
justice antithetical to the traditional modes of Cain's legalized human
administration of law. It would lie in the infinite gift of forgiving love
instead of the finite calculation of debts that are owed. It would lie in the
self-emptying renunciation of power rather than its self-centered seizure.
Hence, Augustine's famous juxtaposition of Cain as the founder of the City
on Earth and Christ as the founder of the City of God.7 There could be no
smooth continuity between the two cities because the nature of human law,
with its limits, liabilities, and assumed scarcities, operated to deny the superabundant reciprocity of love which was the promise of the City of God. In
effect, every legal norm is an act of alienating separation and is complicit in
the crime it names. Every legalized obligation to the other necessarily
presumes, simultaneously, a self-protective limit to obligation, contrary to
that boundless, selfless love and forgiveness which is really owed to the
neighbor. As Martin Luther helped to explain the point, in Christ we look
forward in love while in law we look backward in judgment-a relation of
disjuncture, not just of pale reflection. 8
For Augustine, the City of Earth was represented by Rome, with its
Ciceronian promise of law's rationality and its commitment to giving each
his due, under an assumed mutual agreement-the rudiments of current
social contract theory. Rome celebrated a manly reason which guarded the
self as against the threat of unruly inner passion, just as it seized "reasoned"
authority over potentially unruly women, children, slaves, and animals in the
household, and just as it exercised reasoned discipline over the unruly lower
classes-indeed, just as it kept the barbarians at the gates. It was a
jurisprudence of boundaries, defended by a propositional logic which, said
Augustine, could never be more than partial, contingent, and ultimately selfcontradictory, as well as foundationless; and it was based on legal rhetoric

5. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONCERNING THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS

874 (Henry

Bettenson trans., Penguin Classics 2003) (1467).
6. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the World, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601-02 (1986).
7. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 647

(R.W. Dyson ed. & trans.,

Cambridge University Press 1998) (1467) [hereinafter AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD].
8. Susan R. Martyn, Commentary: The Lawyer in the Religious Traditions: A Lutheran Finds
Commonality, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 299, 299 (2005-2006).
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deployed as weaponry, a weaponry which both concealed and proved the
conventionality and alienation of language.
Augustine undercut law's central premise of Reason by locating human
sin, not simply in the passions, but in that deeper dislocation of the will
which led to the prideful, self-aggrandizing assertion of self over neighbor in
the first place-as with Cain's slaughter of Abel, which then, said
Augustine, was replicated in Romulus's slaughter of Remus, the mythic
founding of Rome's legalized empire. 9 What is any polity, asked Augustine,
but fratricidal seizure, a pirate's bounty writ large?' 0 We should not beguile
and delude ourselves with language which obfuscates the reality of conflict
and bloodshed. "Let us not allow the edge of our attention to be dulled by
the splendid names of things," he warned-an early version of CLS's
critique of legal rhetoric's reification, its constant productions of "splendid
names." "1
Augustine is also well-known, of course, for affirming the tragic
necessity of legal coercion. The peace it brings to an imperfect world, in
this non-messianic age of purely secular, penal time, is better than the chaos
that would follow its dissolution. We need the peace of Babylon, he said,
even if we are delivered from Babylon by faith. And peace, no matter how
imperfect the form, is still a positive good, even if it is a merely imperfect
human good, cobbled together by exiles. Hence, the dialectical relationship
between the two cities: the relationship between the City on Earth and the
City of God is not just a relationship of opposition. To affirm the peace of
Babylon, however, does not allow one to pretend that it is other than the
work of Cain. The peace of Babylon depends upon the coercive control over
others that it is designed to contain.' 2 The hospitality that its city, the City
on Earth, offers is a hospitality that begins and ends in boundaries, and the
gift it offers always comes in the form of exchange.
Augustine's influence continued throughout the Middle Ages. It was
revived in the Reformation, and came to the fore again in Colonial America,
when people seriously pondered how they could possibly reconcile the
exercise of legal authority with their efforts to found Christian communities.
Indeed, quite apart from Augustine, Christianity has always had an
untidy relationship with law. The tension is rooted partly in the stark fact of
a messiah who is crucified under the forms of Roman justice. Moreover, the

9. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, supranote 7, at 639-40.

10. Id.
11. Id. at 146.
12. See id.

synoptic gospels contain explicit antinomian currents. Although Harold
Bloom (a good reader of texts) argues that the gospels are not purely
antinomian, but rather usurpations in relation to law, admonitions like "turn
the other cheek" are hardly a celebration of law as a mode of human
relationship. New work on Paul, some by Jewish scholars, has emphasized
the fact that Paul, especially in that complex and influential epistle directed
right to the heart of Roman rule, was effectively bringing all law and
political authority into question. Human law had collided with a new
messianic reality, and that fact served to challenge Caesar himself. Hence
the repeated dualities: Letter and spirit, death and life, bondage and freedom,
text and faith, law and grace. (For instance, Anne Hutchinson got herself
exiled from the Massachusetts Bay Colony by claiming she was only under
the second word in each of those pairings, and therefore not under the
legalized authority of the Colony's magistrates.) 13 Thus, according to Paul,
even in this present age, when law and political rule would not disappear,
law would be open to new critiques.1 4 It had become deconstructable, so to
speak. Its boundaries, divisions, and coercions had been overturned by a
messianic justice that existed in ontological priority to law. Existing in
Abraham before the law, messianic justice was outside the law and apart
from the law. It was this messianic reality that Augustine would later locate
only in the City of God.
The ontological priority that Augustine affirmed was challenged during
the High Middle Ages when it came to be said that some form of natural law
governance actually existed in the Garden of Eden. (Arguments about
prelapsarian reality are no longer common in legal discourse, but they are
not necessarily unimportant. Such metaphors can be useful.) The same
classical period, relying on the mediation of natural law, strove to ease
contradiction and synthesize antitheses. That process provided law with a
good deal of Christian metaphysical content, which secular princes would
then appropriate for the sake of legal legitimacy even while rejecting the
theology that gave it meaning.
We still depend on some of those constructs, basic even to such vaguely
mystical notions as "representation" and "corporation." Steven Smith is
surely right to suggest that the vocabulary of law is often metaphysical,
although most modem jurists, even while using that vocabulary, claim no
longer to believe in metaphysics. 5 In Felix Cohen's well-known phrase,
which Smith aptly quotes, we still speak "transcendental nonsense."' 16 I do

13. See generally EVA LAPLANTE, AMERICAN JEZEBEL: THE UNCOMMON
HUTCHINSON: THE WOMAN WHO DEFIED THE PURITANS (2004).

LIFE OF ANNE

14. See MARION L. SOARDS, THE APOSTLE PAUL: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS WRITINGS AND
TEACHING 180-81 (1987).
15.

STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY 164(2004).

16. Id. at 13.
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not think that vocabulary means that human law is "really" grounded on the
foundation of divine law. It only shows the continuing influence of the
conceptualism of the High Middle Ages, with its extraordinary effort to
integrate pagan natural law thought, Roman jurisprudence, and Christian
theology.
Thus, I think that CLS did a valuable, Augustine-like task in exposing
the power relations which legal language tends to obfuscate, and in
puncturing the reifications that are so pervasive in law's language. CLS
undercut the inflated claims of law to be the embodiment of Reason, to be
the inevitable deductions from propositional truth, or the outcome of neutral
process, or the historical wisdom of the common law, or whatever. Law was
all much more contingent, more provisional, more self-contradictory, and
much more human than it had been made out to be. And as Peter Gabel kept
insisting, law is also rooted on the premise of human alienation-which is to
say that law, even at its best, is the sober work of Cain, in exile from the
presence of God.17
Peter's insistence on the reality of alienation left unanswered whether,
once exposed, the forms of alienation could be overcome and a truly
transformative politics emerge---one that was about unmediated human
18
Peter says yes, and his
intersubjectivity, not about limits and boundaries.
spirit has been inspiring. 9 On the other hand, I was often grateful for the
silence that others kept about such a possibility. Silence seemed an
appropriate recognition of the fact that law is, by its nature, rooted in human
limitation. It represents the inevitable fact of our incapacity to serve the
neighbor with the boundless responsibility we owe, an impossibility that
becomes abundantly clear with the simple introduction of a third person, as
2°
Silence recognizes how impossible the
Emmanuel Levinas points out.
We may have a
messianic possibility really is in a fallen world.
transcendently-based obligation to try to do law well, but to find in law the
shimmering presence of the transcendent, or even the promise of its potential
realization, is to reduce paradox to linearity and to leave us in the clammy
17. See Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX L. REV. 1563, 1564-65 (1984) [hereinafter Gabel, Phenomenology]; see
also Peter Gabel, Panel Discussion: Does Religious Faith Interfere with a Lawyer's Work?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 985, 1000 (1999) [hereinafter Gabel, PanelDiscussion].
18. Gabel, Phenomenology, supra note 17, at 1566.
19. Gabel, Panel Discussion,supra note 17, at 1001-02.
20. See ADRIAN THEODOOR PEPERZAK & EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TO THE OTHER: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS 229 (1992), available at

http://books.google.com/books (search "Search Books" for "To the Other: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas"; then follow "To the Other" hyperlink).

middle of the night that Levinas once described, where we confront what
only is.

